This presentation explores care as a constitutional right in the Korean context. Care involves three elements: the caregiver, the care-receiver, and the act of caring—actions that allow a person to survive. Care exists because all beings are fundamentally dependent on external support. In physical terms, life must constantly resist entropy increase, and it can only do so through a continuous influx of energy and matter from its environment. From the standpoint of the individual, this is dependence; from the standpoint of the environment, this is care. Human care has specific features: we rely primarily on other humans rather than directly on nature; caregiving relationships carry inherent power imbalances; and our need for care changes dramatically across the lifetime. These characteristics lead to injustice in caregiving. Hans Jonas’ philosophy provides a useful insight to address this problem: responsibility arises not only from one’s actions but also from one’s power. Because caregivers hold greater power, they bear corresponding responsibilities for dependents. Constitutionally, this raises the question of how much of the state’s caregiving responsibility should be legally recognized—as a general principle, a state duty, or a fundamental right. Internationally, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has already recognized a right to care, including the rights to receive care, provide care, and care for oneself. Although the Korean Constitution does not explicitly use the word “care,” a recent Korean Constitutional Court decision on newborn birth registration illustrates a possible breakthrough. The Court recognized a constitutional right to be registered immediately after birth. As the state, newborn, and the birth registration meet the three elements of care, this new constitutional right can be best explained and supported by the logic of care. This opens even the possibility of future constitutional amendments explicitly recognizing a right to care.