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UID:pretalx-bsides-canberra-2025-BRL9QD@pretalx.com
DTSTART;TZID=AEST:20250927T113000
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DESCRIPTION:Ever wondered what it's like to investigate a phishing campaign
 ? Do you just grep the IOCs and call it a day? But what if you go further\
 , how deep do you go? If you stop at the first email\, what are you actual
 ly achieving and does doing that actually help? What if investigating furt
 her results in the operators abandoning the entire phishing-as-a-service o
 peration?\n\nIn this talk\, I'll be speaking about the journey and process
  I took to investigate a previously unknown phishing-as-a-service group th
 at lead to the operators completely shutting down their entire operation w
 ithin days of publishing the report. I'll be going through some of the ops
 ec failures\, source code snippets\, as well as other fun facts and exampl
 es about how threat actors make the same mistakes we do.
DTSTAMP:20260603T234437Z
LOCATION:Off-Main Track
SUMMARY:My First Phish: The SAIGA Saga - Justin Soyke
URL:https://pretalx.com/bsides-canberra-2025/talk/BRL9QD/
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