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UID:pretalx-bsides-canberra-2025-WV9YXP@pretalx.com
DTSTART;TZID=AEST:20250926T110000
DTEND;TZID=AEST:20250926T112500
DESCRIPTION:Host file-access logs can be a valuable source of information w
 hen it comes to detecting the theft of sensitive files or the establishmen
 t of persistence by malware. But how can we leverage logs\, such as those 
 produced by Santa\, for early malware mitigation when monitoring a fleet t
 hat makes an enormous amount of benign file accesses every day? Enter the 
 Suspicious File Access Detection pipeline - an internal\, ML-backed detect
 ion mechanism developed through collaboration between Security and AI soft
 ware engineers at Google. The pipeline is used by Google's Detection & Res
 ponse team to score\, surface\, and investigate clandestine file access be
 haviours.\n\nI’ll take you through the process of how we created a ML mo
 del to score file access logs based on their relative suspicion level. We
 ’ll dig into how we can go beyond prevalence-based anomaly detection and
  utilize embeddings to not just identify activity that is rare\, but activ
 ity that is extremely suspicious for a given host. This approach aims to d
 etect behaviourally-agnostic malware activity involving the modification o
 f sensitive files on disk for Google’s corporate fleet.\n\nFor the purpo
 se of this talk I’ll demonstrate how we use this pipeline with Santa\, a
  publicly available binary and file access authorization system for macOS.
  I’ll take you through the process of how Santa can be configured to mon
 itor areas of the macOS filesystem that are modified to establish persiste
 nce at runtime\, and how the logs are utilized by the SFAD model.
DTSTAMP:20260603T234503Z
LOCATION:Main Track
SUMMARY:Is this binary Naughty or Nice? How Google leverages ML and Santa t
 o detect persistence on MacOS - Kristin Smith
URL:https://pretalx.com/bsides-canberra-2025/talk/WV9YXP/
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