Jonathan Prince
Jonathan spends a large proportion of his time breaking the things enterprises trust most but understand least. He specialises in IBM z/OS and IBM i security, not because it's fashionable, but because someone has to, and the systems running your bank's core transactions deserves more than a checkbox audit.
He analyses authorization models, maps privilege escalation paths, and explains to enterprises why their carefully designed access controls are actually a roadmap for attackers. At home he runs a lab that includes two AS/400s and enough enterprise equipment to make most corporate IT departments uncomfortable, because the best way to understand how to break something is to pwn one.
His current research applies modern offensive security methodology to platforms the industry forgot to threat-model, and demonstrates that the gap between a compromised AD account and privileged access on a mainframe may be smaller, and more traversable, than anyone in your SOC wants to hear.
Session
The need for security professionals to understand permission systems and how their complex structures create paths that aren't visible in spreadsheets or flat lists has become more important than ever. The introduction of OpenGraph to BloodHound unlocked opportunities to apply graph theory to analyze other permission systems and expand the map beyond the borders of Active Directory.
To illustrate how graph theory can be applied to any complex permission system, this talk will walk through the process of creating RACFHound, an open-source integration for RACF, the predominant security manager for mainframes. RACF is used to secure the most critical assets of the global financial system.
Armed with the knowledge of how to implement such an integration, and how the results give unprecedented insight into once opaque systems, you will be ready to apply this approach yourself.
No knowledge of AD, RACF, or even BloodHound is required.