BSidesLuxembourg 2026

What if I told you the security tool you trust the most (your XDR) is also an attacker's favorite weapon? You spent time, money, and effort deploying it, testing it, fine tuning it, believing it had your back. But what if, instead of stopping threats, it was helping them?

Your XDR isn't broken, in fact, it's doing exactly what it's designed to do and what you set it up to do. The problem? Attackers have figured out how to make it work for them instead of against them.

In this session, we'll discuss how the bad guys manipulate XDR implementations, abuse detection logic, weaponize built-in components, and turn trusted security controls into defensive tools. From abusing existing workflows to full exploitation, you'll see why your XDR might not be protecting you the way you think it is.

1. Intro

Short story and correlate it to XDRs.

2. XDR 101: Understanding the Basics

We won’t reinvent the wheel, but understanding how XDRs work is critical, so we can visualize how attackers can weaponize them.

3. Point of Origin: How do attackers access an XDR console?

XDRs are only as strong as their weakest link, and that weak link is often broken access controls, misconfigurations, or outdated components. Attackers don’t always need complex exploits when defenders leave the door open.

· Default Credentials on External-Facing XDR Deployments.

Many XDR solutions have cloud-based management consoles exposed to the internet.
If default credentials aren’t changed, attackers can:

- Log in and modify IOC exclusion rules.
- Uninstall sensors or disable detections.
- Deploy malware directly through the XDR interface.

Countermeasures
- Enforcing MFA on all management consoles.
- Audit externally exposed XDR consoles (does your XDR console really need to be internet-facing?).

· Compromised API keys - The secret backdoor.

· Many XDR solutions have APIs for automation, management and integration. If an attacker finds compromised API keys they can query endpoint logs to map security gaps, modify blacklisting rules and disable detections.

Countermeasures:
- Monitor for compromised credentials and unusual API activity.
- Rotate API keys regularly to limit exposure.
- Use environmental variables instead of hardcoded credentials.

- Outdated XDR Versions – Legacy software is an attacker's best friend.

- Running outdated XDR versions allows attackers to exploit known vulnerabilities in previous versions and abuse compatibility issues to downgrade protections.

Countermeasures:
- Audit security tools for outdated versions regularly.
- Enable automatic updates for XDR components

· Outdated XDR agents - Weak links in the chain

- One endpoint running an outdated version of an XDR sensor is enough for an attacker to exploit known vulnerabilities and bypass detection.

Countermeasures:
- Use SIEM integration or centralized management to monitor XDR agent mismatches.
- Automate XDR agents updates across all endpoints.

4. XDR as an attack vector.

• Your Security Tool is My C2 - Abusing Remote Shell Access.

Many XDR consoles offer built-in shell capabilities that allow defenders to execute limited admin commands on endpoints (for example Crowdstrike Falcon RTR). But if an attacker gains access to the XDR management console, they can run system enumeration commands to:

• Gather information about a host.
• Deploy malicious files or modify settings.
• Use the sensor as a C2 channel.

Countermeasures:

Restrict remote shell access.
- Require MFA for authentication.
- Enforcing RBAC.
- Monitor XDR shell command history.

· Blinding the Guard – Removing and Disabling an XDR Sensor
Before executing an attack, adversaries often remove or disable XDR agents to avoid detection. Some XDR solutions lack strong tamper protection, allowing attackers to:

• Stop XDR services to prevent detection.
• Uninstall the XDR agent using weak removal controls.
• Kill security processes or corrupt critical files to make the sensor non-functional.

Example:
Attempt to stop the XDR service using systemctl stop XDR agent. Kill the process manually using pkill -9 XDR agent and show that detection logs stop, leaving the system unprotected.

Countermeasures:
- Implement tamper protection to prevent unauthorized removal.
- Deploy kernel-based security monitoring (eBPF) to detect service manipulation.

• Hiding in Plain Sight - Whitelisting Malicious IOCs

If attackers gain access to an XDR allowlist, they can manipulate rules to bypass detection entirely.

• Whitelist malware so it is ignored by security controls.
• Drop malicious payloads in trusted directories that are already allowlisted.
• Modify allowlists via API access, letting malware execute freely.

Example:
Identify an XDR allowlist configuration file and manually whitelist malicious IOCs.

Countermeasures:
- Restrict who can modify allowlists (RBAC enforcement).
- Implement cryptographic integrity checks on configuration files.
- Require MFA to modify exclusions.

· When Vintage isn't Always Nicer – Downgrading a Sensor or Preventing Updates
Attackers prefer outdated security tools because they lack modern detection techniques, by preventing updates or forcing a downgrade, attackers can:

• Decrease detection effectiveness by pushing legacy security policies.
• Reintroduce vulnerabilities patched in later versions.
• Prevent new threat signatures from being applied.

Demo: Blocking XDR updates via /etc/hosts and downgrading the agent.

Countermeasures:
- Enforce automatic updates across all endpoints.
- Monitor version mismatches across all deployed sensors.
- Block manual downgrades unless explicitly approved.

· Friendly Fire – Isolating Critical Systems for Disruption

Some XDRs have host isolation features to contain threats. Attackers abuse this to:
- Trigger false positives and force automated isolation.
- Manually isolate critical infrastructure (domain controllers, production servers).
- Lock down an organization without deploying malware.

Countermeasures:
- Implement role-based restrictions on isolation functions.
- Require MFA and secondary approval for manual isolations.
- Alert on mass isolations as a potential attack indicator.

· Spotting a Knockoff – Sensor Spoofing

XDRs rely on heartbeat signals to confirm agents are online and attackers can manipulate this process to:
- Fake sensor check-ins, tricking defenders into believing the agent is still running.
- Redirect telemetry to a different endpoint, suppressing real detections.
- Modify system responses to make XDR appear fully functional while disabled.

Countermeasures:
- Use mutual TLS authentication between XDR agents and servers.
- Monitor for missing logs and no heartbeats.

· Going for the Kill - Leaking Sensitive Information from XDR Logs.

XDR logs store useful information that attackers can abuse. These logs allow security analysts to identify suspicious behavior. Some common techniques include:

• Extracting IP addresses, hostnames and domain controllers for enumeration purposes.
• Enumerating security policies to avoid detection.
• Finding user accounts and credentials stored in logs.

Example: Extracting domain controllers, user accounts, and network data from XDR logs.

Countermeasures:
- Use SIEM log forwarding as a backup and integrity verification.
- Enforce RBAC on log access to prevent unauthorized queries.

· SOC Analysts, It’s Panic O’Clock - Alert Saturation Attacks.

Attackers generate thousands of fake alerts to distract SOC teams from real threats. This allows:

• Overloading analysts with false positives.
• Creating a blind spot, given that some security teams opt to disable XDRs as a way to stop all the noise.
• Hiding legitimate threat activity.

Example: Creating fake logs and flooding a SIEM with fake ransomware alerts.

Countermeasures:
- Leverage anomaly detection activity to identify alert flooding patterns.
- Enforcing log integrity checks to decrease the chances of alert poisoning.
- Rate-limit automated log events to prevent abuse.

5. Catch 22: Detecting Malicious activity without an XDR.

Given that your XDR agent is disabled, visibility is limited. These are some alternatives:
- Syslog Monitoring and SIEM logs: Look for XDR agent stop/disable events in your system logs.
- Monitor authentication logs for suspicious access to the XDR console.
- Review SIEM log ingestion for gaps in log forwarding (if logs stop being ingested, that's typically a red flag).

6. Stop The Bleeding: Immediate Response to Regain Visibility and Isolation.

If an attacker has disabled visibility, you need to contain the compromised host without an XDR. The following alternatives could be applied:
- Quarantine the compromised host using firewall rules of NAC.
- Leverage network based detections (identify suspicious traffic patterns, detect connections to known C2).
- Restore XDR sensor remotely.
- If the attacked blocked reinstallation, deploy a separate forensic agent (such as velociraptor).

7. Beat Them At Their Own Game: Locking the Attacker Out of the Console.

• Check for rogue admin accounts added to your XDR console.
• Rotate API keys and credentials.
• Review XDR logs for unauthorized policy changes.

• Enable MFA on XDR console.

  1. Real-World Case Studies: RansomHub - Weaponizing XDR Weaknesses.

RansomHub is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation first detected in February 2024 by TrendMicro. Unlike highly structured ransomware groups, RansomHub operates as a decentralized affiliate-based collective, allowing attackers from various regions to conduct their own operations under the same banner.
Their primary targets? Organizations with high operational dependencies, industries where downtime is more expensive than the ransom itself, increasing the likelihood of payouts.

· Attack methodology:
RansomHub doesn't rely exclusively on encrypting data, they start by disabling security mechanisms, ensuring they can operate without any roadblocks. They attack chain includes:

- Using TDSSKiller to disable antivirus or XDR solutions in the target system.
- Deploying TOGGLEDEFENDER to disable Windows Defender.
- Utilizing XDR Kill Shifter, a loader executable that leverages the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique, exploiting multiple vulnerable drivers to disable XDR protection before execution.

Key Takeaway: Their focus on XDR disablement as a priority aligns with modern ransomware strategies, attackers don't just evade detection, they neutralize the entire security stack.

· Notable Victims:

Mexican government (Hit Twice!).
- The second attack impacted 13 airports across the country.
- Fun Fact: The Mexican government is a frequent target of ransomware attacks, often due to weak infrastructure, slow patching cycles, and underfunded cybersecurity measures.

Frontier communications.
- Disruption in telecom services, impacting businesses and residential users.

Christie's Auction House
- Attackers targeted high-value transactions and sensitive financial data.

· Key Takeaways:
- RansomHub exemplifies modern ransomware techniques, they don’t just encrypt data, they strategically dismantle defenses first.
- The use of BYOVD attacks on XDRs shows that even advanced security solutions are vulnerable when misconfigurations or unpatched drivers exist.

· Countermeasures: Defending Against RansomHub
- Use behavioral-based detection instead of relying only on signature-based AV/XDR protections.
- Apply strict application control policies to block unauthorized tools.
- Monitor for signs of BYOVD exploitation, harden kernel-level protections to prevent unsigned driver execution.

9. Final Thoughts

Attackers are shifting tactics, instead of just evading security tools, they're actively disabling them. Attackers recognize that XDRs are a core part of enterprise security, so their first priority is to neutralize detection and response capabilities before executing their objective.

The question isn’t if attackers will target your XDR, it’s how prepared you are when they do. The key to defense isn’t just relying on automated detections, but understanding how attackers think and proactively securing the tools meant to protect you.