10-19, 14:00–14:30 (Europe/Luxembourg), Salle Europe
Over the past 20 years there have been 3 waves of Bluetooth (BT) security research. The first wave peaked in 2004, and rather abruptly ended after 2005. Then for a long time there was very low interest and activity. That began to change around 2011 with the release of BT Low Energy (BLE) and the Ubertooth One. But that wave too petered out around 2015. But we are now living in the 3rd wave, and it's far larger than past ones.
In this talk I will be releasing a TiddlyWiki-based, semantically-tagged, timeline of BT security research. Talks have been tagged according to authorship, conferences, and dates. But also according to talk type (attack? defense? reverse engineering? overview?), attack surfaces (L2CAP? BLE LL? ACL-C?), execution environments (Android? Windows? Texas Instruments firmware?), etc. This organized data affords us interesting insights into the most important authors, tools, orgs, and attacks.
I will spend the majority of the time talking about some of the extremely critical vulnerabilities (especially protocol-level vulnerabilities) that have been released in the 3rd wave. These are vulnerabilities that, despite ostensibly being patched, in reality mean that anything with infrequent or non-existent firmware updates, are going to remain hackable indefinitely.
Prior to working full time on OpenSecurityTraining2 (ost2.fyi), Xeno worked at Apple designing architectural support for firmware security; and code auditing firmware security implementations. A lot of what he did revolved around adding secure boot support to the main and peripheral processors (e.g. the Broadcom Bluetooth chip.) He led the efforts to bring secure boot to Macs, first with T2-based Macs, and then with the massive architectural change of Apple Silicon Macs. Once the M1 Macs shipped, he left Apple to pursue the project he felt would be most impactful: creating free deep-technical online training material and growing the newly created OpenSecurityTraining 501(c)(3) nonprofit.