Marta Rychert
Marta Rychert (PhD) is an Associate Professor at the SHORE & Whariki Research Centre. Her work lies at the intersection of health, policy and law, with particular focus on drug policy, cannabis markets (recreational and medical) and their commercialisation. She is a co-Editor-in-Chief of international journal "Drugs, Habits and Social Policy". Prior to her academic appointments in New Zealand she worked in the European Union Drugs Agency in Portugal.
Session
Background: The regulated state-controlled cannabis market in Uruguay has received international attention as an alternative to profit-maximising cannabis legalisation models. However, relatively little is known about how this market has been operationalised and the economic opportunities for private citizens. The presentation will lay foundations for the discussions of the economic aspect of social justice beyond North America.
Methods: Using a literature review, document analysis and key informant interviews conducted during recent fieldwork Uruguay (2024), we identify the key actors with a financial stake in the legal cannabis market in Uruguay, outline how they operate, estimate cannabis sector revenues, and reflect on the economic opportunities.
Results: Licensed production companies and pharmacies are key for-profit organisations involved in the recreational cannabis market in Uruguay. With prices, products and market size controlled by the government, the entrepreneurial decisions of licensed producers are limited, resulting in a focus on cost reduction. The production sector is characterised by a small number of companies that operate at economies of scale, illustrating a ‘commoditised’ cannabis market model. The pharmacy-only retail framework has created new revenue for community pharmacists but may hinder the participation of small-scale legacy players. The not-for-profit Cannabis Social Club (CSC) sector has lower entry barriers, and fewer requirements regarding products and prices, but only a few key individuals may benefit financially due to the sector non-profit regulation. Estimates of annual revenues in the licensed production (4-4.8 million USD), pharmacy point-of-sale (1.1-2.2 million USD) and CSC sectors (8-17.7 million USD) will be provided.
Conclusions: Despite not being designed to pursue economic objectives, the state-controlled cannabis market in Uruguay has created commercial opportunities for several actors. Our analysis suggests that this regulation may represent a compromise from an economic and social justice perspective.