Given the input of rank ordered list from the two-sides, the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) outputs the final match that is stable, strategy-proof, and proposing-side optimal. Moreover, I have also incorporated a feature to include special allocation rule such as reserved seat for a certain group of participants.
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm has been gaining lots of traction in the recent decades as it provides a fully characterized (with desirable characteristics such as strategy-proofness, proposing-side optimality, and stability) allocation given the rank ordered list from the two sides desired to be matched.* I have written a base DAA; given the input of rank ordered list from the two-sides, the algorithm outputs the final match for all. Moreover, I have also written a special case of DA algorithm when there exist an allocation rule: affirmative action in school choice setting.
*Strategy-proofness means that it is weakly dominant strategy for participants to submit their true rankings for the match. Proposing-side optimality means that proposing side (of the two side) will not result in a better match than the algorithm output without hurting another pair. Stability means that no pair can deviate from the algorithm output and result in a strictly better output.